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1ARTICLE VI: ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION
AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
by Graham S. Pearson* & Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 in July 1999 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles
in the draft Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and
are unlikely to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the
end-game.   It is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation
Papers which will consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the
Protocol."   By the end of 1999, Evaluation Papers had been prepared for 14 of the 23
Articles, over half of all the Articles of the Protocol. This Evaluation Paper continues this
series by considering Article VI Assistance and Protection Against Biological and Toxin
Weapons on which the AHG has made progress with the current rolling text containing some
20 sets of square brackets.
Article VI
3.   In October 1999, the text2 for Article VI was unchanged from its earlier versions:
ARTICLE  VI
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance" means the coordination and
delivery to States Parties of protection against biological and toxin weapons,
including, inter alia, any of the following: detection equipment [including
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2biosensors]; alarm equipment; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and
decontaminants; prophylactic, diagnostic and/or therapeutic medical measures and
materials, and/or advice on any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State
Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of
protection against biological and toxin weapons, for purposes not prohibited under
the Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in  [, subject to protection of confidential proprietary information and
national security information] [and under non-discriminatory and equitable
commercial terms,] the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific
and technological information concerning means of protection against biological and
toxin weapons.
4. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry
into force of this Protocol and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a
data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of
protection against biological and toxin weapons as well as such information as may
be provided by States Parties.
5. The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and
at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in
identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective
capacity against biological and toxin weapons could be implemented.
6. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States
Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual
agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of
assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance to the extent possible
through the Organization and to this end may elect to take one or more of the
following measures:
(a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by
the Conference at its first session;
(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Protocol
enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the
procurement, upon demand, of assistance;
(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into force
for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the
Organization.  If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the
assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to
provide assistance in accordance with this Article.
38. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedure set
forth in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 to receive assistance and protection against the
use or threat of use of biological and toxin weapons if it considers that:
(a) Biological and toxin weapons have been used against it;
(b) It is threatened by imminent actions that are prohibited for States
Parties by Article I of the Convention;
(c) It has credible reason to believe it is confronted by imminent actions
or serious threat with respect to actions that are prohibited for States Parties
by Article I of the Convention.
9. The request for assistance, substantiated by relevant information, shall be
submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive
Council and to all States Parties, requesting those States Parties which have
volunteered assistance, in accordance with subparagraphs 7 (b) and (c) to begin
preparations to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of biological and toxin
weapons, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of biological and
toxin weapons to the State Party concerned, not later than 12 hours after receipt of
the request.  [Requests for assistance when a State Party considers that biological or
toxin weapons have been used against it shall [not be considered or otherwise acted
upon by the Director-General or the Executive Council unless a field investigation
request from the State Party making the Article VI request is submitted] [also be
accompanied, either simultaneously or within 12 hours, by a request for a field
investigation pursuant to Article III, section G].]
10.  The Director-General shall initiate, not later than [12] hours after receipt of
a request for assistance, from a State Party, an examination of the request in order to
provide foundation for further action by the Organization.  The Director-General
shall complete the examination within [72] hours and forward a report to the
Executive Council and to States Parties.  If necessary, the time required for
completion of the examination may be extended by periods of [72] hours with reports
being submitted at the end of each [72] hour period, to the Executive Council and to
all States Parties.  The examination shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the
request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts
related to the request as well as make recommendations on the type and scope of
[supplementary] assistance and protection needed.  In the case of request for
assistance when a State Party considers that biological or toxin weapons have been
used against it, the Director-General shall, when possible, incorporate into the
examination report relevant factual information from the affected area(s) [and [, if
appropriate,] progress reports [of the] [from any] investigation team which [is]
[may be] conducting [the] [a] field investigation in the State Party concerned].
11. The Executive Council shall meet not later than [24] hours after receiving an
examination report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple
majority within the following [24] hours on whether to instruct the Technical
Secretariat to provide [supplementary] assistance.  The Technical Secretariat shall
immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the
4examination report and the decision taken by the Executive Council.  When so
decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance
immediately.  For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the
requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations.
The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.
12. If the information available from the ongoing examination or other reliable
sources would give sufficient proof that there are humans, animals or plants affected
by the use of biological and toxin weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the
Director-General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of
assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his/her disposal for such
contingencies.  The Director-General shall keep the Executive Council informed of
actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph.
Thus far, there has been no text provided in Part II by the Friend of the Chair for Article VI.
4.  The provision in the draft Protocol is broader than the limited undertaking placed on
States Parties in Article VII of the BTWC3 which requires that:
Article VII
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger
as a result of violation of the Convention.
5.   Article VI of the Protocol closely mirrors the provisions made in Article X of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)4 which requires that:
Article X
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance" means the coordination and
delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons, including, inter
alia, the following: detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment;
decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and treatments;
and advice on any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any
State Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means
of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under this
Convention.
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53. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.
4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of national programmes
related to protective purposes, each State Party shall provide annually to the
Technical Secretariat information on its programme, in accordance with procedures
to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph
21 (i).
5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry
into force of this Convention and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party,
a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of
protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided
by States Parties.
The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and
at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in
identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective
capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented.
6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States
Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual
agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of
assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization
and to this end to elect to take one or more of the following measures:
(a)To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by the
Conference at its first session;
(b)To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Convention
enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the
procurement, upon demand, of assistance;
(c)To declare, not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into force
for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the
Organization. If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the
assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to
provide assistance in accordance with this paragraph.
8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedures set
forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to receive assistance and protection against the use
or threat of use of chemical weapons if it considers that:
(a)Chemical weapons have been used against it;
(b)Riot control agents have been used against it as a method of warfare; or
6(c)It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for
States Parties by Article I.
9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, shall be submitted to the
Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive Council and to
all States Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the request to
States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c),
to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot
control agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious
threat of use of chemical weapons or serious threat of use of riot control agents as a
method of warfare to the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt
of the request. The Director-General shall initiate, not later than 24 hours after
receipt of the request, an investigation in order to provide foundation for further
action. He shall complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report to
the Executive Council. If additional time is required for completion of the
investigation, an interim report shall be submitted within the same time-frame. The
additional time required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, however,
be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the end of each additional period
shall be submitted to the Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate
and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying the request,
establish relevant facts related to the request as well as the type and scope of
supplementary assistance and protection needed.
10. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 hours after receiving an
investigation report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple
majority within the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical
Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical Secretariat shall
immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the
investigation report and the decision taken by the Executive Council. When so decided
by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance immediately.
For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the requesting State
Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations. The States
Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.
11. If the information available from the ongoing investigation or other reliable
sources would give sufficient proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons
and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall notify all States
Parties and shall take emergency measures of assistance, using the resources the
Conference has placed at his disposal for such contingencies. The Director-General
shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken pursuant to this
paragraph.
6.   There is no comparable provision, for obvious reasons, for assistance and protection in
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)5.
Evaluation
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77.  The provisions in the Protocol Article VI can now conveniently be considered on a
paragraph by paragraph basis.
8.  Paragraph 1.   This sets out the definition of "Assistance" using identical language to that
in the CWC Article X, paragraph 1, except in the following respects:
a.  The Protocol states that ""Assistance" means any of the following:" whereas the
CWC language has the simpler ""Assistance" means the following:"
b   A similar variation is where the Protocol says "and/or advice on any of these."
whilst the CWC has the simpler "and advice on any of these."
c.   There is also a difference in the list of protection with the Protocol including
"detection equipment [including biosensors]; alarm equipment;" in contrast to the
CWC language "detection equipment and alarm systems;".    Our view is that the
square brackets should be removed so as to provide clarity that detection equipment
does include biosensors.   It is not evident why the Protocol uses different language
regarding alarm equipment rather than and alarm systems as in the CWC.
d.  A further variation is where the Protocol provides for the inclusion of
"prophylactic, diagnostic and/or therapeutic medical measures and equipment" in
contrast to the CWC language "medical antidotes and treatments;".   The Protocol
terminology is correctly tailored to the particular characteristics of medical
countermeasures for protection against biological and toxin agents.   It also is usefully
broader in that it includes "and equipment".
9.   Paragraph 2.  This has identical language to that in the CWC, Article X, paragraph 2.  It
provides the important undertaking that nothing in the Protocol shall impede the right of a
State Party to engage in protection against biological and toxin weapons.
10.  Paragraph 3.  If the language within square brackets is ignored, this paragraph has
identical language to that in the CWC, Article X, paragraph 3 in stating that each State Party
has the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to protection against
biological and toxin weapons.   The language in square brackets has no parallel in the CWC
text.  It therefore has to be considered what is added if the square brackets were removed.
Both sets of language in the square brackets [, subject to protection of confidential
proprietary information and national security information] [and under non-discriminatory
and equitable commercial terms,] state what is obvious and is implicit in the language fullest
possible exchange.    There is thus no added value from the language in square brackets and
we therefore recommend that all the language in square brackets in paragraph 3 be deleted.
11.  CWC Paragraph 4.  This paragraph, which in the CWC, requires States Parties to
provide information annually on their national programmes related to protective purposes, has
no parallel in Article VI of the Protocol because Article III Compliance Measures D.
Declarations contains provisions for annual declarations of (C) Current Defensive
[Programmes][Activities].   There is no necessity therefore to include such language in
Article VI.
812.   Paragraph 4.  This has identical language to the first sentence of the CWC, Article X,
paragraph 5, requiring the Technical Secretariat to establish a database.
13.  Paragraph 5.   This has identical language to the second sentence of the CWC, Article X,
paragraph 5, requiring the Technical Secretariat to provide expert advice and assistance to a
State Party if requested.
14.  Paragraph 6.  This has identical language to that in the CWC, Article X, paragraph 6.  It
provides the assurance that nothing in the Protocol shall impede the right of States Parties to
request and provide assistance bilaterally.
15.  Paragraph 7.  The chapeau differs significantly from that in the CWC, Article X,
paragraph 7 through two changes.    In the first change, the chapeau preserves the undertaking
"to provide assistance through the Organization" but qualifies this undertaking with the
words "to the extent possible" which do not appear in the CWC provision.
16.  The words "to the extent possible" make explicit in the Protocol what was implicit in the
CWC.   As has been noted6:
"The implicit understanding is not reflected in the text [of the CWC] that only those
States Parties which are economically and technologically capable of rendering
assistance are expected to make contributions for this purpose."
By placing these additional words in the chapeau, the Ad Hoc Group is emphasizing the
optional character of the measures set out in subparagraphs (a) to (c).   This may be regarded
as a useful clarification.  It recognises the reality that not all States Parties will be in  a
position to contribute in any of the three ways suggested.   It removes the uncertainty over the
legal position of such States Parties which commentators on the CWC have identified7:
"The agreement on such a provision [as CWC, Article X, paragraph 7] on assistance
through the organization was only possible after extensive negotiations and
consultations... The main obstacle of an agreement was whether the assistance to be
rendered by the Organization should be provided by the States Parties on a
mandatory or voluntary basis."
17.  Krutzsch and Trapp concluded8 that the provision of assistance through the Organization
was an "unequivocal obligation for States Parties" which could not be replaced by bilateral
agreements alone.   They also concluded that the undertaking in the chapeau had a
"mandatory character" which included selecting "one or more of the ways offered in
subparagraphs (a) to (c)".  Although they were critical of the first sentence of subparagraph
(c) which they noted "gives rise to practical and legal problems", they found that it had to be
read consistently with a strong interpretation of the undertaking as a whole:
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9"The second sentence of subparagraph (c) emphasizes that the margin of discretion
given in this provision does not detract from the mandatory character of the
undertaking in the chapeau of paragraph 7."
18.  The qualifying phrase "to the extent possible" introduced in the Protocol applies to the
undertaking as a whole because it is placed in the chapeau.  It therefore has the effect of
changing the obligation "to elect to take one or more of the following measures" from "one or
more" to 'one or more or none' according to the possibilities open to each of the States
Parties.   At this point it ceases to be an obligation.
19.   The second change in the chapeau from that in the CWC, Article X, paragraph 7 follows
logically from the introduction of the qualifying phrase "to the extent possible".  In place of
the undertaking in the CWC "to elect to take one or more of the following measures", the
Protocol cuts off the obligatory language of an undertaking after "Each State Party
undertakes to provide assistance to the extent possible through the Organization", and
continues in optional mode: "and to this end may elect to take one or more of the following
measures." [Emphasis added]
20.  It also follows that the second sentence of subparagraph (c) has a different effect in the
Protocol from its equivalent provision in the CWC.  In the CWC it returned States Parties, if
unable to honour a declaration previously made under subparagraph (c), to the original
position in which they had to make a selection among the measures;  and it placed them under
a stronger obligation this time to select the financial measure by contributing to the voluntary
fund under subparagraph (a).  In the Protocol, however, its effect is only to return such States
Parties to the overall obligation "to provide assistance to the extent possible through the
Organization."   Our view is that the Protocol paragraph 7 is thus more realistic than, and is
free of the ambiguity in, the corresponding CWC paragraph.
21.  Paragraph 8.  This, in the chapeau, sets out the right of each State Party to request and
receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of biological and toxin
weapons if it considers that certain conditions apply.   The language in the chapeau is
identical to that in the CWC, Article X, paragraph 8 although there are differences in the
conditions:
The first condition is identical in both the Protocol and the CWC:
(a) Biological and toxin weapons have been used against it;
The second condition in the CWC relates to the use of riot control agents and
therefore has no parallel in the Protocol.
The second condition in the Protocol is somewhat similar to the third condition in the
CWC.   The Protocol language is:
(b) It is threatened by imminent actions that are prohibited for States
Parties by Article I of the Convention;
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whereas the CWC language is:
(c)It is threatened by actions or activities of any State that are prohibited for
States Parties by Article I.
The Protocol language thus requires actions to be imminent and does not explicitly
include activities.   The exclusion in the Protocol of the words of any State is useful
reflecting the particular difficulties in respect of biological and toxin weapons of
identifying the perpetrator of prohibited actions.  Furthermore, following the Aum
Shinrikyo attack of the Tokyo subway, it is clear that the actions threatening a State
Party, which consequently requests assistance under the Protocol, need not be limited
to the action of a State but may result from actions by sub-State actors.
The third condition in the Protocol has no parallel in the CWC and states:
(c) It has credible reason to believe it is confronted by imminent actions
or serious threat with respect to actions that are prohibited for States Parties
by Article I of the Convention.
This language requires the State Party requesting assistance to have credible reason to
believe that it is confronted either by imminent actions or serious threat with respect
to actions that are prohibited to States Parties by Article I of the Convention.   The
requirement to have credible reason is implicit in any request by a State Party for
assistance and is therefore strictly not necessary.  As to the confrontation by imminent
actions, this does not differ substantially from the second condition where the State
Party is threatened by imminent actions.  The alternative confrontation by serious
threats with respect to actions does provide a somewhat broader condition in that
these actions are not limited only to those that are imminent.
In considering both the second and third conditions in the Protocol, our evaluation is
that the CWC language is preferable with its specific inclusion of both actions or
activities and is not limited to those that are imminent.  Our recommendation is that
there would be improved clarity and thus advantage in merging (b) and (c) to read:
(b) It is threatened by actions or activities that are prohibited for States
Parties by Article I of the Convention.
22.  Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12.   These elaborate the procedure to be followed following a
request for assistance.   They broadly follow the parallel procedure in the CWC, Article X,
paragraphs 9, 10 and 11.
23.  Paragraph 9.   The first sentence is similar to the two first sentences in the CWC, Article
X, paragraph 9 except that the Protocol language makes it explicit that the request is for
assistance, the two sentences from the CWC are merged into a single sentence in the Protocol
and the Protocol is more cautious in that the Director-General shall request States Parties to
begin preparations to dispatch emergency assistance whereas in the CWC language the
Director-General shall forward the request to dispatch emergency assistance.
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24.  The second sentence of paragraph 9, which is in square brackets, has no parallel in the
CWC.   This language would limit consideration or action on requests for assistance when a
State Party considers that biological or toxin weapons have been used against them
conditional on the submission of a request for a field investigation.   Although in an ideal
world, a request for a field investigation might well accompany a request for assistance, in
practice the primary requirement in the event of an attack resulting in significant casualties
will be for immediate assistance as it will be far from clear whether the outbreak has resulted
from natural causes or an attack by biological weapons and the request for an investigation is
likely to be some time later when the State Party had considered the information available to
it.   This is especially true for an incident arising from biological agents because these can
occur naturally.   It is thus undesirable to make the consideration or action on requests for
assistance conditional on the submission of a request for a field investigation.
25.  Paragraph 10.   This broadly follows the remainder of paragraph 9 of the CWC although
in the Protocol the requirement is for the Director-General to carry out an examination of the
request whereas in the CWC the Director-General is to carry out an investigation of the
request.   The term an investigation was deliberately chosen in the CWC to differ from the
term inspection and is intended to cover the range of options which might be taken by the
Director-General upon receipt of a request for assistance -- this might include going to the
State Party that had requested assistance or to neighbouring States or simply be the
examination of all available information. A great deal will depend on the individual
circumstances of the event which has resulted in the request for assistance.
26.  In the Protocol, it is important to use a term that is different from an investigation and
this is achieved by the term an examination which again covers the range of options which
might be taken upon receipt of a request for assistance.   Insofar as the times are concerned,
those in the Protocol, currently in square brackets, are the same as in the CWC with the
exception that in the Protocol the Director-General shall initiate the examination not later
than [12] hours after receipt of the request for assistance whereas the CWC requirement is for
an investigation to be initiated not less than 24 hours after receipt of the request for
assistance.   The Protocol language requires the examination to make recommendations on
the type and scope of [supplementary] assistance and protection needed.    The CWC has
identical language without square brackets around the word supplementary.
27.  The Protocol language also includes a final sentence which has no parallel in the CWC
which requires that:
In the case of request for assistance when a State Party considers that biological or
toxin weapons have been used against it, the Director-General shall, when possible,
incorporate into the examination report relevant factual information from the affected
area(s) [and [, if appropriate,] progress reports [of the] [from any] investigation
team which [is] [may be] conducting [the] [a] field investigation in the State Party
concerned].
This provides a useful addition so long as the consideration of the request for assistance is not
made conditional upon a request for a field investigation.
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28.  Paragraph 11.  This sets out the requirement for the Executive Council to meet and has
language that is essentially identical to the CWC, Article X, paragraph 10 with the Protocol
language using examination in place of investigation and the word [supplementary] currently
being within square brackets.
29.  Paragraph 12.  This enables the Director-General to take immediate action to take
emergency measures of assistance and has language that is essentially identical to the CWC,
Article X, paragraph 11 with the Protocol language using examination in place of
investigation.
Strikethrough Text for Article VI
30.  It is recommended that Article VI should read as follows:
ARTICLE  VI
ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS
1. For the purposes of this Article, "Assistance" means the coordination and
delivery to States Parties of protection against biological and toxin weapons,
including, inter alia, any of the following: detection equipment [including
biosensors]; alarm equipment; protective equipment; decontamination equipment and
decontaminants; prophylactic, diagnostic and/or therapeutic medical measures and
materials, and/or advice on any of these protective measures.
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State
Party to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of
protection against biological and toxin weapons, for purposes not prohibited under
the Convention.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in  [, subject to protection of confidential proprietary information and
national security information] [and under non-discriminatory and equitable
commercial terms,] the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific
and technological information concerning means of protection against biological and
toxin weapons.
4. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later than 180 days after entry
into force of this Protocol and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a
data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of
protection against biological and toxin weapons as well as such information as may
be provided by States Parties.
5. The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and
at the request of a State Party, provide expert advice and assist the State Party in
identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective
capacity against biological and toxin weapons could be implemented.
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6. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States
Parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual
agreements with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement of
assistance.
7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance to the extent possible
through the Organization and to this end may elect to take one or more of the
following measures:
(a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance to be established by
the Conference at its first session;
(b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days after this Protocol
enters into force for it, agreements with the Organization concerning the
procurement, upon demand, of assistance;
(c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this Protocol enters into force
for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the
Organization.  If, however, a State Party subsequently is unable to provide the
assistance envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the obligation to
provide assistance in accordance with this Article.
8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject to the procedure set
forth in paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 to receive assistance and protection against the
use or threat of use of biological and toxin weapons if it considers that:
(a) Biological and toxin weapons have been used against it;
(b) It is threatened by imminent actions or activities that are prohibited for
States Parties by Article I of the Convention;
(c)        It has credible reason to believe it is confronted by imminent actions
or serious threat with respect to actions that are prohibited for States Parties
by Article I of the Convention.
9. The request for assistance, substantiated by relevant information, shall be
submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit it immediately to the Executive
Council and to all States Parties, requesting those States Parties which have
volunteered assistance, in accordance with subparagraphs 7 (b) and (c) to begin
preparations to dispatch emergency assistance in case of use of biological and toxin
weapons, or humanitarian assistance in case of serious threat of use of biological and
toxin weapons to the State Party concerned, not later than 12 hours after receipt of
the request.  [Requests for assistance when a State Party considers that biological or
toxin weapons have been used against it shall [not be considered or otherwise acted
upon by the Director-General or the Executive Council unless a field investigation
request from the State Party making the Article VI request is submitted] [also be
accompanied, either simultaneously or within 12 hours, by a request for a field
investigation pursuant to Article III, section G].]
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10.  The Director-General shall initiate, not later than [12] hours after receipt of
a request for assistance, from a State Party, an examination of the request in order to
provide foundation for further action by the Organization.  The Director-General
shall complete the examination within [72] hours and forward a report to the
Executive Council and to States Parties.  If necessary, the time required for
completion of the examination may be extended by periods of [72] hours with reports
being submitted at the end of each [72] hour period, to the Executive Council and to
all States Parties.  The examination shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the
request and the information accompanying the request, establish relevant facts
related to the request as well as make recommendations on the type and scope of
[supplementary] assistance and protection needed.  In the case of request for
assistance when a State Party considers that biological or toxin weapons have been
used against it, the Director-General shall, when possible, incorporate into the
examination report relevant factual information from the affected area(s) [and [, if as
appropriate,] progress reports [of the] [from any] investigation team which [is]
[may be] conducting [the] [a] field investigation in the State Party concerned].
11. The Executive Council shall meet not later than [24] hours after receiving an
examination report to consider the situation and shall take a decision by simple
majority within the following [24] hours on whether to instruct the Technical
Secretariat to provide [supplementary] assistance.  The Technical Secretariat shall
immediately transmit to all States Parties and relevant international organizations the
examination report and the decision taken by the Executive Council.  When so
decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall provide assistance
immediately.  For this purpose, the Director-General may cooperate with the
requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international organizations.
The States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to provide assistance.
12. If the information available from the ongoing examination or other reliable
sources would give sufficient proof that there are humans, animals or plants affected
by the use of biological and toxin weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the
Director-General shall notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of
assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at his/her disposal for such
contingencies.  The Director-General shall keep the Executive Council informed of
actions undertaken pursuant to this paragraph.
